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CHANGING LEAD INTO GOLD: EXAMINING AGENCY
ATTEMPTS TO USE THE CLEAN WATER ACT TO SOLVE
ECOSYSTEM DEGRADATION ISSUES
N. LINDSAY SIMMONS*
For over thirty years the Environmental Protection Agency and
Army Corps of Engineers have attempted to use the Clean Water Act for
wetland conservation practices. This comment explores the legislative
history behind federal regulation of waterways and whether the language
or purpose of the Clean Water Act adequately aligns with wetland protec-
tion efforts. Specifically, it examines how the Clean Water Act emerged
out of a national interest in water pollution control, while wetland protec-
tion efforts stem from a growing interest in ecosystem protection. The com-
ment will examine how a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreted
the Act consistently with the Act’s goal of pollution control and explores
how the plain meaning and purpose of the statute does not directly sup-
port ecosystem protection. The comment then examines what the future
of wetland protection looks like under the Act, in light of the Supreme
Court decisions and a newly proposed regulation that redefines “waters
of the United States.” The paper concludes that if the nation wishes to
seriously pursue ecosystem protection goals, it must pass new legislation
with those goals in mind rather than attempting to use a water pollution
statute to solve ecosystem degradation issues.
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INTRODUCTION
Wetland protection is the most prominent hot-button regulatory
area under the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “the Act”).1 The CWA has ex-
plicit authority over traditional aquatic ecosystems, such as lakes, tribu-
taries, and rivers, but does not authorize jurisdiction over wetlands.2 In
1972 Congress was spurred to create an Act that would address the rising
1 See Mark S. Dennison & James F. Berry, Challenging Wetland Regulation of Land
Development, 53 AM. JUR. TRIALS 511, 526 (2013) (noting the filling of wetlands has
become one of the “most controversial areas of environmental protection law and policy.”).
2 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (containing entire provisions for waterways such as lakes,
rivers, and oceans, but no mention of authority over wetlands).
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water pollution crises that plagued the nation.3 The language in the Act
reflects this focus. For instance, the main enforcement provision of the
Act, § 301, prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by any person.”4
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing today, biologists, envi-
ronmentalists, and governmental agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Army Corps of Engineers (“Army
Corps”) have recognized the importance of ecosystem protection, and es-
pecially wetland protection.5 Thus, EPA and Army Corps began to seek
regulatory methods for protecting wetlands. The CWA seemed like an
obvious choice. Like the Act’s other jurisdictional waters, wetlands play a
vital role for many of the nation’s aquatic organisms and many wetlands
are inseparably linked to the water quality of other jurisdictional waters.6
Thus, in 1977, Army Corps incorporated wetland protection into the § 404
permitting program.7
In response to these attempts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
interpreted the Act in accordance with pollution prevention values and
has narrowed the agency’s authority to regulate wetlands under the Act.8
Despite the Supreme Court’s continued narrowing of the CWA’s scope,
EPA and Corps continue to attempt to protect these important ecosys-
tems with the Act.9 Most recently, the agencies have proposed issuing
a new rule that attempts to keep the CWA’s jurisdiction over aquatic
3 See History of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (April 17, 2013), http://
www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act, archived at http://perma.cc/L56A
-HWR7 (stating that public awareness and concern for controlling water pollution led to
the amendments of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, modifying it into the
modern CWA).
4 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012) (emphasis added).
5 See Federal Programs, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.epa.gov
/greatlakes/fedprograms.html#epa, archived at http://perma.cc/9XXP-UBJ5.
6 See National Water Quality Guidance Standards for Wetlands, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (Sept. 18, 2014), http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/quality.cfm,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZUJ9-PMQD.
7 Section 404 governs a permitting scheme directed by Army Corps. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
It is one of two primary permitting schemes under the CWA, the second being § 402. 33
U.S.C. § 1311 (2012) (listing the two permitting schemes as exceptions for § 301’s prohi-
bition against the discharge of pollutants). § 402 governs effluent discharges, while § 404
governs dredging and filling. 33 U.S.C. § 1324; 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
8 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 724–26 (2006) (discussing the two prior
Supreme Court decisions which analyzed Army Corps’s scope of authority over wetlands
under the CWA).
9 See Stephen M. Johnson, The Rulemaking Response to Rapanos: The Government's Best
Hope for Retaining Broad Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 36, 37 (L. Kinvin Wroth, ed., 2007).
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ecosystems as broad as possible10 while comporting with the Court’s most
recent reading of the Act.11
This comment will examine whether the Act ever was, or ever can
be, an effective tool for wetland protection in light of the Supreme Court’s
interpretive methods. The Introduction discussed the issue and provides
an overview of the comment.12 Part I will examine the history of the
nation’s federal statutory laws as they relate to the regulation of water-
ways and congressional motivation for passing them.13 Part II will examine
how the nation’s views of wetlands have changed over the course of
history and discern when and how EPA and Corps took up the mantle to
protect them.14 Part IV will examine the CWA in the context of statutory
interpretation by examining cases that analyzed the CWA under differ-
ing approaches.15 Part V will examine the future of wetland protection by
examining agency and lower court interpretations of the Supreme Court
decisions, including the agencies’ newly proposed definition for “waters
of the United States,” and the lower court decisions that examine the
enforcement § 404.16 Section VI will conclude.17
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL REGULATION
OF NATIONAL WATERWAYS
Legislation pertaining to waterways has existed in the United
States for over 100 years.18 However, major legislation did not exist for
environmental protection until the 1960s.19 The two primary statutes
that demonstrate the evolution of waterway legislation in the United
States are the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (“RHA”) and the CWA.
10 See Kim Diana Connolly, Any Hope for Happily Ever After? Reflecting on Rapanos and
the Future of the Clean Water Act Section 404 Program, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 47, 48 (L. Kinvin Wroth, ed., 2007).
11 Definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg.
22188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014).
12 See supra Part I.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part VI.
16 See infra Part V.
17 See infra Part VI.
18 See David Lawrence Hankey, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899:
The Erosion of Administrative Control by Environmental Suits, 29 DUKE L.J. 170, 176–79
(1980) (discussing the earliest statutes passed by Congress regulating waterways).
19 Id. at 172.
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A. Interstate Commerce Dependent on Interstate Travel: Congress
Asserts its Authority over Interstate Waters Through the Rivers
and Harbors Act
During the 1800s, the federal government struggled to exert its con-
stitutionally sanctioned power over interstate commerce.20 The federal
government’s power to regulate interstate waterways for interstate
commerce was a persistent area of contention.21 The disputes often involved
private parties obstructing interstate waterways, often sanctioned by
state law.22 These obstructions had a major impact on interstate commerce.
The mid- to late 1800s experienced rapid growth in interstate travel and
commerce.23 Inventions such as the steamboat made interstate travel via
rivers and other waterways an increasingly popular choice for trade.24
The obstructions often frustrated vessels’ abilities to continue forward or
resulted in property damage to either the vessel or the obstructions.25
Consequently, the federal government brought a series of lawsuits
under the commerce clause to prohibit the continued construction of such
obstacles.26 However, the court system largely refused to grant any
remedy to the federal government in the absence of a congressional act
providing it with authority to regulate interstate waterways.27 Congress
responded to these court decisions by passing a series of congressional
actions, culminating in the creation of the RHA.28 The RHA primarily
serves two purposes. First, it prohibits the discharge of refuse into water-
ways without a permit.29 Second, it prohibits the construction of struc-
tures, or any project involving excavating and filling waterways, without
20 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1824) (discussing the basic parameters of
congressional power over interstate commerce).
21 See id. at 1–2 (discussing the circumstances of the complaint—involving a state-mandated
exclusive use to an interstate waterway); see also Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
27 U.S. 245, 246 (1829) (discussing the circumstances of the complaint, involving a state
authorized construction of a dam in an interstate waterway).
22 E.g., id.
23 Hankey, supra note 18, at 174–75.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Willson, 27 U.S. at 246 (stating that the constructed dam obstructed navigation
of the waterway and that the defendants of the case broke and damaged the dam while
navigating the waterway).
26 Hankey, supra note 18, at 175.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 176–81.
29 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2012).
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permission from Army Corps.30 Both provisions facilitate federal control
over obstacles impeding interstate travel through waterways.31
Facilitating interstate transportation remained the central purpose
of the RHA until the 1960s.32 The advent of environmental legislation in the
1960s, and specifically the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),
began influencing Army Corps’s application of the RHA.33 Prior to the
environmental movement, Army Corps approved permits for projects based
strictly on navigability concerns.34 After NEPA, Army Corps began con-
sidering environmental factors during the permitting process and impos-
ing pollution controls on projects.35 Before issuing a permit for a project,
Army Corps is required to evaluate “all relevant factors.”36 Among the
relevant factors, Army Corps began to consider how an issued permit
would affect ecology, pollution, fish and wildlife, and conservation.37 The
case Zabel v. Tabb affirmed Army Corps’s authority to consider environ-
mental factors by stating that Army Corps has the authority under § 10 of
the RHA to deny a permit for reasons unrelated to navigation.38
Despite Army Corps’s efforts to expand the purview of the RHA,
it suffered from a major constraint. Section 10 of the RHA specifically
makes it unlawful to “excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify
the course, location, condition, or capacity of . . . any navigable water of
the United States.”39 The character and purpose of the RHA, its goal of
facilitating federal control over interstate commerce, shaped the inter-
pretation of “navigable” under the Act.
The doctrine created in the 1870 case The Daniel Ball set forth a
two-prong test to determine whether a water body is “navigable”:
1) The water must, in it its present condition, be capable
of being used by vessels to transport interstate commerce;
and
30 Id. at §§ 401, 403.
31 Hankey, supra note 18, at 172.
32 Id. at 172–73.
33 Id.; see also Dennison & Berry, supra note 1, at 526.
34 See Dennison & Berry, supra note 1, at 526; see also Hankey, supra note 18, at 172
(describing the reasons for the RHA’s ratification and Army Corps’s power prior to the
environmental movement).
35 Hankey, supra note 18, at 172–73.
36 Id. at 182.
37 Id.
38 430 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970).
39 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964) (emphasis added).
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2) it must form a continuous highway with other waters
over which commerce could be transported to other states.40
The Daniel Ball standard persisted for decades.41 While a series of
Supreme Court decisions in the early to mid-1900s eroded the require-
ments for the first prong of the test to include those waters which may
be made navigable after “reasonable improvements,” the second prong’s
exclusive jurisdiction over only interstate waters remained strong into
the 1970s.42
Until the 1970s, Army Corps stringently applied The Daniel Ball
standard for defining “navigable waters.”43 During the 1960s and 1970s,
Congress pushed Army Corps to expand its definition so that more waters
would be protected from environmental harm under the RHA—a request
Army Corps continued to refuse.44 Zabel established that Army Corps could
account for environmental concerns while choosing to issue permits,45 but
without an expansive definition of “navigable” Army Corps only had author-
ity over a portion of the water bodies that suffered from pollution.46
In 1972, Army Corps finally conceded and expanded its definition
to include all “traditional navigable waters.”47 The more expansive defi-
nition included “all waterways . . . capable of being used for . . . interstate
or foreign commerce, irrespective of whether the waterway itself crosses a
state line, [and] irrespective of . . . how, or by what mode . . . [the interstate
commerce] occurs.”48 Although Army Corps acquiesced to Congress’s
requests, several circuits disagreed with this expansive application of the
40 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 564 (1870).
41 See Puente de Reynosa, S. A. v. City of McAllen, 357 F.2d 43, 50 (1966) (addressing the
defendant’s argument that the waterway in question is not “navigable” under The Daniel
Ball standard).
42 See Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 623 (8th Cir. 1979)
(stating that the first prong of The Daniel Ball test has been broadened, but the second
prong, requiring a navigable interstate linkage by water, “has remained unchanged”).
43 See Virginia S. Albrecht et al., Could SWANCC be Right? A New Look at the Legislative
History of the Clean Water Act, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11042, 11049–50
(2002) (discussing the tension between Congress and Army Corps as they struggled to
agree on a definition for “navigable waters”).
44 Id. at 11050.
45 Zabel, 430 F.2d at 203.
46 See Albrecht et al., supra note 43, at 11045–46 (discussing how Congress pushed for
Army Corps to assert authority over intrastate lakes; which Army Corps refused).
47 Id. at 11046.
48 Id.
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RHA, finding The Daniel Ball standard to still be the appropriate test.49
Although Army Corps ultimately failed at using the RHA for the expan-
sive purpose Congress desired, Congress pursued its desire to regulate
pollution in all waterways by finalizing the CWA the same year Army
Corps passed its “traditional navigable waters” definition.50
B. The Environmental Movement in the 1970s and the
Congressional Push for a Cleaner, Healthier Environment
During the 1960s and 1970s, the American people became in-
creasingly concerned over the state of their environment.51 A few key
events precipitated the increasing cry for environmental laws pertaining
to water quality.52 One extreme example was the Cuyahoga River event
in Cleveland Ohio in 1969, where oil and industrial wastes in the water
caused the river to burst into flame.53 Although this event garnered more
attention than other instances of dramatic water pollution, it was not an
isolated event. A series of studies conducted between the late 1960s to
early 1970s reported a number of severe water quality issues in many of
the nation’s waters.54 In 1972 Congress responded by revising the 1948
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, shaping it into what is currently
referred to as the “Clean Water Act.”55
49 See Hardy Salt Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156, 1168 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating
that The Daniel Ball standard for “navigable waters” was intended to apply because it
existed when the RHA was ratified, and because Congress was aware of the Supreme Court
decision and standard when used as a term of art in the Act); see also Minnehaha Creek
Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F. 2d. at 623 (disagreeing with Army Corps’s attempt to
expand the definition of “navigable waters” to include all waterways “which form a
continuous highway which may consist of water, rail or road connections”).
50 See Albrecht & Nicklesburg, supra note 43, at 11046.
51 ERIN L. GORDON, HISTORY OF THE MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1




54 ROBERT W. ALDER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 5 (1993). Some of these
water pollutant issues included: tests showing that 30% of drinking water had elevated
levels of chemicals exceeding the Public Health Service limits; high levels of mercury in
various fish caught and sold for consumption; high levels of DDT in various consumable
fish; as many as two million acres of shellfish beds closed due to elevated pollutants; and
“record numbers of fish kills.” Id.
55 History of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (last updated July 8, 2014),
http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act, archived at http://perma.cc
/PGK3-K343.
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Prior to the 1972 revisions to the CWA, states had primary control
over setting water pollution standards.56 The 1948 version of the CWA
provided funding to states to clean up the pollution in their waterways,
but set few federal standards for pollution control.57 The 1972 revisions
to the Act were focused on the federal government taking a stronger stand
on improving the nation’s waters.58 Congress’s concern over the rising
dangers of the nation’s degraded water quality drove it to open the newly
revised Act with several policy goals.59 These goals include the elimina-
tion of the “discharge of pollutants into navigable water[ways],” the im-
provement of water quality to provide for the “protection and propagation
of fish . . . [and] shellfish,” and other general goals to eliminate pollut-
ants from waterways.60 They reflect the goal that led to the revisions’
enactment: improving water quality by eliminating pollutants from the
nation’s waters.61
The theme of water quality improvement is repeated throughout
the rest of the Act.62 Provisions in the Act cover: oil spills, toxic pollutants,
sewage, and funding research on the effects of various pollutants.63 The
Act was also developed to facilitate federal ability to enforce provisions
seeking to improve water quality.64 Before the 1972 revisions, the federal
government was required to prove that a discharge caused harm in order
to prohibit further discharges.65 Section 301 provided the needed teeth
for the Act to be an effective enforcement tool.66 Section 301 specifically
56 See ALDER ET AL., supra note 54, at 6.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 7.
59 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
60 Id.
61 See id. (including goals primarily encompassing the elimination of pollutants in
navigable waters, the elimination of toxic pollutants in navigable waters, and fostering
and financially supporting wastewater treatment).
62 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312–30 (2012). Section 302 allows the Administrator to establish
effluent limitations for point sources which may affect water quality. 33 U.S.C. § 1312.
Section 303 provides authority to establish water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
Section 305 requires states to annually report the state of the water quality of all
navigable waters contained in the state. 33 U.S.C. § 1315. Section 311 creates a program
for reducing the number of oil and hazardous waste spills. 33 U.S.C. § 1321. These are
just a few examples of the dozens of provisions within the Act that specifically regulate
pollution control or improving water quality. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
63 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
64 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (providing the Administrator of EPA with the authority to pursue
enforcement actions whenever a person is in violation of the Act).
65 ADLER ET AL., supra note 54, at 7.
66 Id. at 8.
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prohibits the discharge of any pollutant unless the discharge is in compli-
ance with the Act.67 The provision facilitated Congress’s enforcement
goals by shifting the burden of proof onto the discharger: the discharger
must show that any discharges are permitted by the Act, rather than forc-
ing the government to show that the discharges harm the waterway.68
Section 301 provides several ways for a discharge to be legal.69
The most commonly used are the two permitting programs that allow the
federal government to authorize discharges.70 Section 402 created the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting
program, which is used to regulate effluent discharges from point sources.71
The same program is used by EPA to set effluent guidelines for industries.72
The other permitting program is governed by § 404.73 Like § 402, § 404
authorizes specific types of discharges pursuant to a permit. Where § 402
authorizes effluent discharges, § 404 authorizes discharges of solid materi-
als, specifically dredged and fill materials.74
Given Army Corps’s history of regulating the RHA, which also
regulated dredged and fill material, Army Corps was charged with regulat-
ing the § 404 program.75 Initially, Army Corps continued to interpret “navi-
gable waters” narrowly, in line with its interpretation under the RHA.76
In 1975, the Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) challenged
Army Corps’s definition in NRDC v. Callaway.77 The Court found that
Congress intended for the term “waters of the United States” to assert “fed-
eral jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permis-
sible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,” thus finding Army
Corps could not limit its scope to “the traditional tests of navigability.”78
In response to the Court’s decision, Army Corps promulgated a far more
expansive rule in 1977, which extended jurisdiction over traditional
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).
70 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2012).
71 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
72 See ADLER ET AL., supra note 54, at 151.
73 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
74 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2012).
75 See Mark A. Chertok, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, SN085 ALI-ABA 1137, 1146
(2008) (stating that Army Corps was accorded authority over § 404 given its prior ex-
pertise over § 10 of the RHA).
76 Id.
77 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
78 Id. at 686.
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waterways such “as rivers, lakes, and streams,” and also asserted juris-
diction over wetlands.79
II. WETLANDS: LATE BLOOMERS IN THE PUBLIC’S EYE FOR
ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION
National interest in ecosystem protection is not new. In the early
1900s, President Theodore Roosevelt was famous for his focus on ecologi-
cal protection.80 He began several projects aimed toward protecting whole
ecosystems, such as the National Wildlife Refuge System.81 The nation’s
interest in ecosystem protection has evolved throughout its history.82 In
early decades, many ecosystems were protected for their aesthetic beauty
or their usefulness for outdoor activities such as fishing or hunting.83 In
the early 1970s, the nation grew more interested in curtailing the rise in
endangered species and Congress passed the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”).84
Congress included §§ 5 and 7 in the ESA to protect ecosystems des-
ignated as “critical habitat” for endangered species.85 In more recent de-
cades, scientific studies show that certain ecosystems provide “services”
that are beneficial to human and non-human life alike.86 In some cases,
these “ecological services” are not only beneficial, but their absence can
cause catastrophic effects to both humans and non-humans.87 Thus, inter-
est in preserving ecosystems that provide services has grown in America.88
79 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37144 (July 19, 1977).
80 The 5 Most Environmentally Friendly Presidents in U.S. History, Scribol (Feb. 28,
2008), http://scribol.com/uncategorized/the-5-most-environmentally-friendly-presidents
-in-u-s-history, archived at http://perma.cc/L3Y6-MYVG.
81 Id.
82 See A History of Conservation, DEL. DIV. OF FISH AND WILDLIFE, http://www.dnrec
.delaware.gov/fw/dwap/Pages/HistoryofCons.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/ET7V-ZEYH
(last visited Nov. 13, 2014) (providing a timeline of different movements related to eco-
logical conservation in America).
83 Id. (describing “The Era of Game Management” between 1930 and 1965, which was
spurred by an interest in maintaining populations of wildlife for fishing and hunting).
84 James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered
Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 313 (1990).
85 Id. at 311, 314–15.
86 See infra Part II.B.
87 Id.
88 See Ecosystem Research, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/eco-research
/ecosystems-services, archived at http://perma.cc/Y3BV-4YLJ (last updated May 21, 2014)
(discussing the growing interest in utilizing ecosystem services).
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Prior to the past few decades, Americans had very little interest in
preserving wetlands.89 This Part will track the nation’s history regarding
wetlands. Part II.A will examine the historical perception of wetlands.90
Part II.B will discuss the many ecosystem services that wetlands provide.91
Part II.C will discuss how Army Corps has tried to promote the preserva-
tion of wetlands by using the CWA as a tool.92
A. Venomous Streams which Breed Disease: A Historical
Perspective of Wetlands
In the seminal case of Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
Chief Justice Marshall crystallized the American opinion of wetlands
when he described the marsh that was the subject of the case as: “[i]t is one
of those sluggish reptile streams, that do not run but creep, and which,
wherever it passes, spreads its venom, and destroys the health of all
those who inhabit its marshes.”93 At best, wetlands were obstacles to
overcome—land to be drained and filled in order to be used for agricul-
ture.94 More commonly, Americans viewed wetlands as sinister land-
scapes that bred disease.95 Thus, between the 1600s and the latter half
of the 1900s, Americans were encouraged to convert wetlands into fertile
agricultural land.96
The movement to drain and fill wetlands was not merely cultur-
ally encouraged, but was often sanctioned and subsidized by law.97 As
late as the 1970s, Congress still subsidized individuals’ conversion of
wetlands into more “beneficial” purposes.98 The Watershed Protection
and Flood Prevention Act both directly and indirectly increased wetland
89 See THOMAS E. DAHL & GREGORY J. ALLORD, History of Wetlands in the Conterminous
United States, in UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER SUPPLY PAPER No. 2425,
19–25 (1996) (describing the history of American attitudes toward wetlands).
90 See infra Part II.A.
91 See infra Part II.B.
92 See infra Part II.C.
93 Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 249 (1829).
94 See DAHL & ALLORD, supra note 89, at 20.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 19–25 (describing the process of draining and converting wetlands into
agricultural land in the United States).
97 Id. at 20 (stating that South Carolina authorized the conversion of swampy areas into
agricultural land while North Carolina and Virginia surveyed them for reclamation into
water transportation routes).
98 Id. at 24.
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drainage near flood-control projects.99 The U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture also helped facilitate wetland destruction by subsidizing projects
converting wetlands into agricultural land.100 These subsidies led to an
average of 550,000 acres of wetlands lost per year between the mid-1950s
to mid-1970s.101 By the late 1970s and early 1980s,102 public awareness
of the importance of wetlands began to rise.103 Americans now recognize
wetlands as important natural resources that provide a plethora of eco-
logical services.104
B. Wetland Ecological Services
EPA defines wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or satu-
rated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support and that under normal circumstances do support a prevalence
of vegetation which is typically adapted for saturated soils.”105 A wide
variety of ecosystems fall under this definition.106 EPA identifies at least
four major varieties of wetlands, with at least twelve subcategories,
including areas such as swamps, marshes, bogs, and wet meadows.107
99 Id. Directly, the Federal Government subsidized or facilitated wetland losses through
public work projects, technical practices, and cost-shared drainage programs administered
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. DAHL & ALLORD, supra note 89, at 24. Indirectly,




102 Army Corps first recognized the importance of wetlands by including them within its
interpretation of “waters of the United States” in 1977. 33 C.F.R. 323.2(a)(3) (1978).
Wetlands came into more national focus in the mid-1980s when the first federal statute,
the Emergency Wetland Resources Act of 1986, was passed to directly protect wetlands
and the 1985 Supreme Court decision of U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., in which
the Court affirmed that the CWA could be used to extend to adjacent wetlands. See DAHL
& ALLORD, supra note 89, at 24; 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
103 See DAHL & ALLORD, supra note 89, at 24.
104 See infra Part II.B.
105 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2013).
106 See Scott G. Leibowitz et al., Non-navigable Streams and Adjacent Wetlands: Addressing
Science Needs Following the Supreme Court’s Rapanos Decision, 6 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY
& ENV’T 364, 366 (listing several varieties of wetlands which do not necessarily share a
surface connection with a navigable stream).
107 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TYPES OF WETLANDS (Sept. 2001), available at http://
water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/types_pr.pdf (identifying major categories
of wetlands).
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Some of these are connected to adjacent waterways such as tribu-
taries or rivers, but many are isolated108 ecosystems.109 Of the twelve sub-
categories of wetlands, only two (tidal marshlands and mangrove swamps)
definitely abut a waterway.110 The rest, including wet meadows, vernal
pools, playa lakes, all types of swamps, bogs, and fens may, or more often
may not, lie adjacent to a waterway.111 Each type of wetland plays a unique
ecological role, and all are critical resources to hundreds of species.112
This Part will examine why wetlands warrant federal protection.
Part II.B.1 will examine those wetlands that lie adjacent to more tradi-
tional waterways, such as lakes and rivers. It will discuss how these ad-
jacent wetlands are beneficial to those adjacent waterways.113 Part II.B.2
will examine the manner in which all wetlands provide ecological services
in themselves, independent of a connection with other waterways.114
1. Wetlands as Resources to Traditional Navigable Waters
Wetlands often act as buffer zones to other waterways, such as
lakes and rivers. The wetlands acting as buffers benefit traditional navi-
gable waters in the following ways:
Sediment Removal and Shore Maintenance. Development projects
and agriculture primarily lead to soil erosion and sediment-enriched run-
off.115 Sedimentation impacts water quality in two ways. An excess of sedi-
ments in a waterway leads to turbidity, which in turn affects the water
quality and impacts aquatic life.116 Additionally, the majority of nutrients
which enter into waterways as run-off are attached to sediment par-
ticles.117 Wetlands prevent sedimentation in two ways. First, they act as
a buffer for run-off, catching the excess sediment before it enters adjacent
108 Just how “isolated” a wetland is in relation to other waterways has been, and continues
to be, the most central area of contention in wetland protection under the CWA. See infra
Parts III–IV.
109 Wetland Types, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/types
_index.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/FC23-3YER (last updated July 16, 2013).
110 Id.
111 See id.
112 See Swamps, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/swamp
.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/W3N2-ES7A (last updated Oct. 10, 2012).
113 See infra Part II.B.1.
114 See infra Part II.B.2.
115 Turbidity and Sedimentation, NOAA, http://nerrs.noaa.gov/doc/siteprofile/acebasin
/html/modules/watqual/wmtursed.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6DG-MX96.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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waterways.118 Second, the root structures of the vegetation hold together
the sediment and soil at shore-lines, preventing excess soil erosion.119
Nutrient and Toxin Removal. Buffer zones absorb large quantities
of phosphorous120 and nitrogen,121 the two primary nutrients which lead to
eutrophication.122 Phosphorous and nitrogen are released from a range of
anthropogenic sources, including agriculture, wastewater, and chemical
runoff in storm-water.123 Not only do wetlands act as pre-existing buffers
for non-point sources of pollution such as agriculture,124 but are also usable
for supplemental treatment to pretreated waters, such as wastewater.125
One study shows that one hectare of wetland can absorb as much as 50
percent of the phosphorous and nitrogen from wastewater from 60 people,
and that one hectare can absorb up to 75 percent of the wastewater from
20 people.126 Additionally, wetlands mitigate damage from materials such
as heavy metals and other toxins that are harmful when consumed by
humans or wildlife.127 The wetland either absorbs the toxins into the soil
of the wetland, or chemically alters them into a less harmful form.128 The
technique of using wetlands as a water treatment option is now so preva-
lent that these wetlands are now referred to as “treatment wetlands.”129
118 See DYANNE SHELDON ET AL., WETLANDS IN WASHINGTON STATE VOL. 1 2-35-38, http://
www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/sea/wetlands/bas/vol1final/Chapter%202%20_Volume%201
_pdf (listing several studies examining the desired width for a wetland to be an effective
buffer against sedimentation).
119 Wetlands and People, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands
/people.cfm#erosion, archived at http://perma.cc/5A2M-E4VW (last updated Mar. 6, 2012).
120 See SHELDON ET AL., supra note 118, at 2–35 (noting that one study found the wetland
to take up 80% of the available sediment).
121 See Mats Jansson et al., Wetlands and Lakes as Nitrogen Traps, 23 AMBIO 320, 323–24
(1994) (discussing various studies on the uptake of nitrogen in wetlands used as buffers).
122 J.W.G. Lund, Eutrophication, 180 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LOND 371, 371 (1972).
123 See Sources of Eutrophication, WORLD RES. INST., http://www.wri.org/our-work/project
/eutrophication-and-hypoxia/sources-eutrophication, archived at http://perma.cc/ET4W
-CAMZ (listing the primary sources of nutrient pollution).
124 William J. Mitsch et al., Phosphorus Retention in Constructed Freshwater Riparian
Marshes, 5 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 830, 830 (1995).
125 See Dale S. Nichols, Capacity of Natural Wetlands to Remove Nutrients from Wastewater,
55 J. (WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED’N) 495 (1983) (finding that wetlands can take up
high quantities of Nitrogen, Phosphorous, Iron, Calcium, and Aluminum from pretreated
wastewater).
126 Id. at 501–02, Figure 4.
127 See Functions and Value of Wetlands, WASH. ST. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://www.ecy.wa
.gov/programs/sea/wetlands/functions.html, archived at http://perma.cc/YMY6-AJ6U.
128 Id.
129 See Stephen Cole, The Emergence of Treatment Wetlands, 32 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH 218A,
218A (1998); see also ROBERT H. KADLEC & SCOTT D. WALLACE, TREATMENT WETLANDS i
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Water Temperature Maintenance. Forested wetlands provide cover
over waterways, and thus help maintain a cooler water temperature.130
Temperature control in waterways is important for several reasons.131
First, cooler water is able to transport more dissolved oxygen than warmer
water.132 Dissolved oxygen is an important resource in aquatic ecosys-
tems.133 Some species of fish, especially sport fish such as trout and
salmon, require higher levels of dissolved oxygen and thrive only in
waters with cooler temperatures.134 Additionally, most aquatic organisms
are cold-blooded, and their metabolic rate is dependent on their environ-
mental temperature.135 When the environmental temperature is warmer,
the species have a higher metabolic rate.136 A higher metabolic rate
creates a greater bodily demand for food and oxygen, while also causing the
body to produce more waste.137 Studies show that temperature moderation
created by buffering wetlands is especially beneficial in the hotter months
such as July.138
2. Intrinsic Values of Wetlands
In addition to their contribution to the health of adjacent water-
ways, wetlands provide a number of ecological services independent of
adjacent waterways.139
Groundwater Recharge. Underground aquifers are replenished by
water from the surface seeping through the ground into the aquifer.140
(CRC Press 2009); Robert L. Knight et al., The Use of Treatment Wetlands for Petroleum
Industry Effluents, 33 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 973, 973 (1999).
130 See SHELDON ET AL., supra note 118, at 2-35-36 (listing several studies citing the optimal
buffer widths adjacent to waterways in order to maintain temperature control).
131 Temperature Impacts on Stream Ecology, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.water






136 Temperature Impacts on Stream Ecology, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.water




139 WASH. ST. DEPT. OF ENERGY, supra note 127.
140 Id.
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Wetlands are important resources for aquifers.141 Since the water in a
wetland seeps at a slow rate, filtration of the water can occur before it
enters the aquifer.142 Additionally, the slow rate of seepage provides a
stable source of replenishment for the aquifer.143
Flood Protection. Wetlands act as sponges for surrounding lands
and waterways.144 The hydrology of wetlands often reduces flood peaks
by absorbing water during high periods of flow, then slowly releasing the
water thereafter.145 Wetlands also absorb storm energy.146 Coastal wet-
lands are especially important for flood protection.147 They also help pro-
tect inlands from major storms such as hurricanes.148 As hurricanes move
further inland, the severity of storms decrease.149 Coastal wetlands in
particular can absorb immense amounts of energy from a hurricane,
significantly reducing the severity of hurricanes before they reach human-
populated inland areas.150 Wetland loss can thus cause extreme conse-
quences to human inhabited areas.151
Louisiana is one of the most prominent examples of how wetland
destruction can cause harm to human civilizations during floods.152 The
wetlands in Louisiana stretch about 300 kilometers along its coast, and up
to 130 kilometers inland.153 These wetlands represent approximately 40
percent of the nation’s continental wetlands, but 80 percent of the nation’s
wetland losses.154 Of the remaining 3 million acres of wetlands left in
Louisiana, about 75 square kilometers are lost annually.155 The damages





145 WASH. ST. DEPT. OF ENERGY, supra note 127.
146 John Tibbetts, Louisiana Wetlands: A Lesson in Nature Appreciation, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES A40, A42–43 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc






152 See Louisiana Coastal Wetlands: A Resource at Risk, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://
pubs.usgs.gov/fs/la-wetlands/, archived at http://perma.cc/8JMB-LYSN (discussing the
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loss.156 The two hurricanes passed through areas of the Mississippi River
Delta that had suffered the greatest wetland loss between 1932 and 1990.157
Carbon Sequestration. Peat-lands are unique ecosystems which
are known for their ability to trap carbon from the atmosphere.158 Peat-
lands are wetlands primarily consisting of waterlogged dead and decay-
ing plant material rather than normal soil.159 This type of wetland makes
up approximately half of all of the global wetlands.160 Although they only
cover about 3 percent of the Earth’s surface, they currently store about
30 percent of all of the carbon on land.161 Due to the unique anaerobic
conditions of peat-lands, decay of plant material is slowed, and layers of
still carbon-rich plant material becomes trapped underneath layers of
new decaying vegetative material.162 The dredging and draining of peat-
lands in turn releases their stored carbon, hastening climate change.163
Thus the importance of preventing the disturbance of peat-lands is
twofold: the continued existence of the wetlands allows for their utiliza-
tion for their carbon sequestration capabilities, while avoiding their
destruction in order to prevent the release of great quantities of carbon
into the air.164
Habitat. Wetlands are areas of high biodiversity. Nearly half of
all threatened and endangered U.S. species use wetlands during their
life cycle, and more than a third of all threatened and endangered species
exclusively inhabit wetlands.165 Wetlands are also a major stopping point
for many migratory birds, especially waterfowl.166 Not only is habitat
protection important from a conservation standpoint, but it is important
from an economic and aesthetic standpoint.167 Wetlands provide a rich
habitat for many natural resources of economic benefit such as consum-
able fish, timber, wild rice, and medicines.168 Wetlands have also become
156 Tibbetts, supra note 146, at A40–43.
157 Id.
158 DANIELA RUSSI ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIVERSITY FOR WATER
AND WETLANDS 11 (2013) (discussing peat-lands’ unique ability to sequester carbon).
159 Peatlands, WETLANDS INT’L, http://www.wetlands.org/?TabId=2737, archived at http://
perma.cc/CEY2-P29K.
160 Id.
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increasingly popular for their aesthetic and cultural values.169 More than
half of all U.S. citizens enjoy outdoor activities centered on wildlife, much
of which is dependent on wetlands for continued survival.170
Fishing Industry. The fishing industry is a major source of jobs in
the U.S. economy.171 The fishing industry puts $159 billion into the nation’s
economy per year and provides nearly two million jobs.172 Wetlands are
intrinsically intertwined in the fishing industry.173 Three quarters of the
nation’s fish production depends on marshes and other wetland environ-
ments.174 Many species of animals are dependent on wetlands for all or
part of their life cycle, some of which humans commonly consume.175
Even those species of fish that do not inhabit wetlands are often depend-
ent on the benefits provided by wetlands.176 “Wetlands cycle nutrients out
of mud, sand, and water back into bays, lakes, and streams.”177 Thus, any
food species that are freshwater, or spend some part of their life cycle in
bays, are dependent on wetlands for their water filtration properties.178
A few key examples demonstrate the importance of wetlands to the
fishing industry. The salmon industry in northern California has plum-
meted by 80 percent since the 1960s.179 Investigation into this loss revealed
that many of the spawning and juvenile grounds for the salmon included
a great deal of wetlands destroyed in the 1960s.180 Perhaps the pithiest
example of the importance of wetlands for fisheries is their role in the
shrimping industry in the Gulf of Mexico.181 Shrimping is a major indus-
try, creating half a million dollars of income for U.S. fishermen per year,
and it was worth over $838 billion between 1995 and 1996.182 The industry
is also nearly completely dependent on wetlands.183 The National Marine
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Fisheries, Wetlands and Jobs: The Value of Wetlands to America’s Fisheries, CLEAN
WATER NETWORK (Mar. 1998), available at http://www.pcffa.org/wetlands.pdf.
172 Id. at i.
173 See id.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 1.
176 See CLEAN WATER NETWORK, supra note 171.
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 Id. at 5.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See CLEAN WATER NETWORK, supra note 171.
183 Id.
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Fisheries Service estimates that 98 percent of fish and shellfish harvested
from the Gulf of Mexico are wetland dependent.184 Shrimp are especially
dependent on wetlands, spending their juvenile life stages in marshes and
mangrove forests.185 The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council
has noted that the weakest link in sustaining the shrimping industry is
the continual decline of these marshes and mangrove forests.186
C. Wetlands and the Clean Water Act
In 1977, five years after the original 1972 CWA revisions were final-
ized, wetlands received their first direct mention in a CWA regulation.187
After coming under fire for its limited definition of “navigable waters” in
Callaway,188 Army Corps issued a new rule defining “waters of the United
States.”189 The new rule included “adjacent wetlands” for all inland waters
and tributaries as well as any “isolated wetlands” that could affect in-
terstate commerce if degraded.190 In 1977, the CWA was in the process
of receiving a new set of amendments.191 A bill was proposed to define
“navigable waters” for § 404 in a manner which would expressly autho-
rize the regulation of wetlands; the bill was defeated.192
Army Corps’s inclusion of wetlands in its 1977 rule spurred a series
of developments extending into the mid-1980s, focused on bringing wet-
lands into the fold of the CWA.193 In 1980, EPA issued new guidelines for
§ 404 which purposely tied the maintenance of wetlands with the Act’s
original goal of restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and bio-




187 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (July 19, 1977).
188 See 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
189 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (July 19, 1977).
190 Id.
191 See Albrecht et al., supra note 43, at 11051.
192 Id.
193 See James K. Jackson & William A. Nitze, Wetlands Protection Under Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act—The Riverside Bayview Decision, Its Past and Future, 7 PUB. LAND
L. REV. 21, 38–39 (1986).
194 See 40 CFR § 230.1 (2014) (stating that from a national perspective, the degradation or
destruction of aquatic ecosystems such as wetlands is considered to be severely opposed
to the Act’s goal of the restoration and maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the nation’s waters).
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and Army Corps promulgated a series of regulations related to § 404 that
provided Army Corps with stronger authority to regulate wetlands under
the permitting program.195 In 1986, wetlands received legislative atten-
tion when Congress passed the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act.196
Under this Act, the federal government was authorized to purchase wet-
lands and to establish a National Wetlands Priority Conservation Plan.197
The Act also placed more requirements on states to place a higher priority
on wetland protection.198
Perhaps the biggest boon for wetland protection efforts was the
1985 Supreme Court decision of United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc.199 The case resolved a sequence of cases that challenged Army Corps’s
authority to require a § 404 permit before filling a wetland.200 Cognizant
of Congress’s ambiguity in defining the term “navigable waters,” the Court
found that Army Corps’s definition of waters was reasonable.201 It rea-
soned that Congress’s evident concern for the protection of water quality
suggests that Army Corps’s interpretation to extend jurisdiction over adja-
cent wetlands was acceptable.202 Recognizing wetlands’ critical role to a
waterway’s water quality, the Court quoted Army Corps’s determination
regarding its authority over wetlands:
The regulation of activities that cause water pollution
cannot rely on . . . artificial lines . . . but must focus on all
waters that together form the entire aquatic system. Water
moves in hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of this part
of the aquatic system, regardless of whether it is above or
below an ordinary high water mark, or mean high tide line,
will affect the water quality of the other waters within that
aquatic system.203
195 See Jackson & Nitze, supra note 193, at 39.
196 16 U.S.C. § 3901 (1986).
197 16 U.S.C. §§ 3921, 3922 (1986).
198 Id.
199 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
200 Id. at 123.
201 Id. at 133. The Court appeared to recognize not only Congress’s ambiguity, but also its
questionable intent behind its “broad” definition of “navigable waters.” See id. The Court
noted that it is “one thing to recognize that Congress intended to allow regulation of waters
that might not satisfy traditional tests of navigability; it is another to assert that Congress
intended to abandon traditional notions of ‘waters’ and include in that term ‘wetlands’
as well.” Id.
202 Id.
203 474 U.S. at 133–34.
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The decision was a monumental step toward protecting a larger
range of ecosystems, and one which relied heavily on the original legisla-
tive intent behind the Act: “to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”204 By focusing on the
hydrologic cycle and vegetative communities rather than the physical
attributes of the ecosystem, the court recognized the complex ecological
relationship between wetlands and their adjacent waterways.205
The Riverside Bayview decision was critical in the modern world of
federal wetland protection, but the purview of the decision was limited.206
The Court tactfully did not state that wetlands are “waters of the United
States,” fitting into the definition for “navigable waters.”207 It only found
that it is reasonable for Army Corps to regulate wetlands which are adja-
cent to “waters of the United States,” due to the impact adjacent wetlands
have on jurisdictional waters.208
III. CONSEQUENCES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ON ARMY CORPS’S
REGULATION OF WETLANDS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Just as Congress in the 1970s struggled to fit pollution controls
into a statute aimed toward facilitating navigation,209 Army Corps and EPA
have struggled to fit ecosystem protection for wetlands into a statute
primarily concerned with water pollution.210 What Zabel accomplished for
pollution control within the RHA context,211 Riverside Bayview accom-
plished for wetland protection in the CWA.212 Zabel affirmed that Army
Corps has the authority to consider environmental concerns while issu-
ing a permit under the RHA.213 While this provided Army Corps with the
ability to extend pollution controls to interstate waters, courts continuously
found that the second prong of The Daniel Ball test still applied disallowing
204 Id. at 132.
205 See Leibowitz et al., supra note 106, at 365–66 (discussing the complex biological and
hydrological relationships between streams and wetlands).
206 474 U.S. 121, 139 (finding that Army Corps has authority over those wetlands that are
adjacent to “waters of the United States”).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See supra Part II.A.
210 See infra Part III.A.
211 See 430 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming Army Corps’s authority to consider
environmental factors before issuing a permit).
212 See 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1986) (affirming Army Corps’s authority to regulate wetlands
under § 404 when the wetland is adjacent to a navigable water).
213 430 F.2d at 203.
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regulation of intrastate waters under the RHA.214 Riverside Bayview
similarly confirmed that Army Corps has authority to regulate the dredg-
ing and filling of wetlands.215 However, the decision focused on how adja-
cent wetlands can affect the water quality of waterways, and did not touch
on preserving wetlands because of their independent ecological value.216
As Army Corps began to pass more expansive regulations to protect wet-
lands after the Riverside Bayview decision,217 courts began to scrutinize
the language of the CWA more closely to determine the acceptable param-
eters of the water pollution statute.218
This section will examine certain provisions of the CWA: §§ 404,
301, and 505, pursuant to the principles of statutory interpretation. Specif-
ically, each section will focus on several key Supreme Court decisions that
interpreted the CWA and how those interpretations have affected the pro-
tection of wetlands. This section will primarily examine two methods of
statutory interpretation: Part III.A will discuss a typical textualist ap-
proach to statutory interpretation: it will examine those opinions which
focus on the strict text of the CWA to ascertain meaning behind specific
words and phrases used in the Act. Part III.B will focus on the imaginary
reconstructive approach to statutory interpretation, where the Court ex-
amines the Act’s purpose, goals, structure, and legislative history in order
to ascertain what Congress likely intended by a word or phrase.
A. Plain Meaning and Textualism
Plain Meaning is the most prominent tool of statutory interpreta-
tion.219 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that when “the words of the
statute are unambiguous, the ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ”220 First,
214 See Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. V. Hoffman, 597 F. 2d 617, 623 (5th Cir. 1979)
(stating that the second prong of The Daniel Ball test has “remained unchanged” for the
application of the RHA).
215 See 474 U.S. at 139.
216 Id. at 134 (discussing Army Corps’s conclusions that adjacent wetlands may serve to
filter and purify water that drains into adjacent waterways).
217 See, e.g., SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 164 (discussing
1986 “Migratory Bird Rule” promulgated by Army Corps to extend § 404 jurisdiction over
intrastate waters used as habitat for certain types of birds).
218 See infra Part III.A; Part III.B.
219 See Katherine Clark & Matthew Connolly, A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and
Applying Statutes, THE WRITING CTR. AT GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR. 3 (2006), available
at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship
/writing-center/upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf.
220 Desert Place, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (citing Connecticut Nat. Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).
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textualists place significance on every word within a statute; no word is
treated as surplusage.221 Second, textualists often interpret statutes by
the “ordinary” or “reasonable” meaning of the words within the statute.222
Courts use several methods to ascertain a word’s “ordinary” meaning.223
First, many statutes contain sections with statutory definitions.224 Statu-
tory definitions are the first and best source to ascertain the meaning of
a word in a statute,225 and govern how the term is defined.226 Courts also
often use dictionaries to find the “ordinary” meaning of words.227 How-
ever, dictionaries may not contain a dispositive definition; many words
have several alternate meanings.228 Under these circumstances, the con-
text of a word is often the best guide for ascertaining the most appropri-
ate meaning.229
These principles are the guiding tools behind the textualist ap-
proach to statutory interpretation.230 This section will examine how three
major Supreme Court decisions interpreted language within the CWA
following the textualist principles and how those interpretations have
affected wetland protection. The cases examined are: Solid Waste Agency
of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”),231
Rapanos v. United States,232 and Gwaltney Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc.233
1. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers
Following the Riverside Bayview decision, the Supreme Court once
again examined the scope of Army Corps’s authority over wetlands in
221 Clark & Connolly, supra note 219, at 6.
222 Id. at 3.
223 Id.
224 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
225 Clark & Connolly, supra note 219, at 3.
226 Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. CRS-5 (Aug. 31, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97
-589.pdf.
227 Id. at CRS-6.
228 Id. at CRS-6 to CRS-7.
229 Id.
230 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 742 (3rd ed. 2001) (discussing the principles behind
New Textualism).
231 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
232 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
233 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
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SWANCC.234 The case involved the “Migratory Bird Rule,” passed one
year following the Riverside Bayview decision.235 The rule extended § 404
authority over any intrastate water used as habitat by birds protected
under the Migratory Bird Treaties, birds that cross state lines, or any
endangered species of birds.236 The Petitioner purchased a site that con-
tained several long-abandoned sand and gravel pits.237 After long abandon-
ment, a successional forest overtook the site and the pits became seasonal
ponds often used by birds during migration.238 Petitioner planned to trans-
form the site into a disposal site for nonhazardous solid waste.239 SWANCC
applied for a § 404 permit, was denied, and filed suit.240
Like Riverside Bayview, the crux of the case hinged on the mean-
ing of “navigable waters.”241 The Court discussed several arguments pre-
sented by Army Corps in support of its defense of the Migratory Bird
Rule, including legislative intent and history, but the Court focused
its inquiry on the plain language of the statute.242 It reasoned, “subse-
quent history is less illuminating than contemporaneous evidence . . .
respondents face a difficult task in overcoming the plain text and import
of § 404(a).”243
By this principle, the Court refused to interpret the Act in a
manner that would treat the word “navigable” in “navigable waters” as
mere surplusage.244 The Court recognized that the term may have limited
power, as discussed in Riverside Bayview, but “it is one thing to give a
word limited effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.”245
Thus, the Court concluded that by including the word “navigable” in the
CWA, Congress showed that to some degree it intended to extend CWA
authority only over waters that are or could reasonably be made into
navigable waters.246
234 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
235 Id. at 164.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 163.
238 Id. at 163–65.
239 Id. at 163.
240 531 U.S. at 165.
241 Id. at 165–66.
242 Id. at 170.
243 Id. (emphasis added).
244 Id. at 172.
245 Id.
246 531 U.S. at 172. Specifically, the Court asserted that Army Corps only has authority
over those waters which “were or had been navigable in fact or could reasonably be made
so.” Id.
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SWANCC represents a straightforward application of the concepts
behind the plain meaning theory.247 The Court was compelled to give the
word “navigable” some meaning; it refused to treat the word as mere
surplusage.248 The following Supreme Court decision to examine § 404’s
scope over wetlands contained a far murkier application of the “plain
meaning” doctrine.
2. Rapanos v. United States
Rapanos v. United States involved a landowner developing his
property by filling wetlands.249 The Petitioner filled the wetlands without
obtaining a § 404 permit, and Army Corps sued.250 The wetlands in question
were not directly adjacent to a waterway, but did lie near ditches which
emptied into traditional navigable waters.251 Justice Scalia, a self-pro-
claimed textualist, announced the judgment of the Court in a plurality
decision.252 Given Scalia’s textualist approach, he focused heavily on the
language used in the governing provisions.253
He began with the language in § 301, from which § 404 derives its
power to regulate the dredging and filling of waterways and wetlands.254
Section 301 provides that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful.”255 Scalia, recognizing that statutory definitions govern
the meanings of words within the statute, looked to § 502, the definitions
provision of the CWA, to ascertain the meaning of words in § 301.256
First, he conceded that “pollutant” is defined broadly “to include not only
traditional contaminants, but also solids such as ‘dredged spoil, . . . rock,
sand, [and] cellular dirt.’ ”257 However, what he found to be “most relevant,”
247 See Clark & Connolly, supra note 219, at 6 (stating that words in a statute cannot be
treated as surplusage).
248 531 U.S. at 172. Courts will typically only treat a word in a statute as surplusage if
the word is repugnant to the rest of the statute. Clark & Connolly, supra note 219, at 9.
249 547 U.S. 715, 719 (2006).
250 Id. at 715.
251 Id. at 729.
252 Id. at 715. The opinion was not a majority vote, but a plurality. See id. Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court, his opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, and Alito. Id. Justice Kennedy
concurred with the judgment but wrote a separate opinion. 547 U.S. at 759–87.
253 See id. at 723 (examining several words or phrases in the governing CWA provisions
to focus his analysis).
254 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006).
255 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) (internal quotations
omitted)).
256 Id.
257 Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006)).
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was that the CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.”258 From here, Scalia dove into an
exposition focused on the singular word “waters” to eviscerate attempts
by Army Corps and EPA to use the Act to protect wetlands beyond those
directly adjacent to traditionally navigable waters.259
Scalia primarily focused on the fact that Congress specified
authority over “the waters of the United States” rather than “water of
the United States.”260 He found that the dictionary defines “waters” as
water found in “streams and bodies forming geographical features such
as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.”261 Comporting with this definition, he con-
cluded that the term does not encompass “transitory puddles or ephem-
eral flows of water.”262 He found Army Corps’s definition, which included
ephemeral streams, wet meadows, storm sewers and culverts, man-made
drainage ditches, among others, to go “beyond parody” of the plain
language within the statute.263
Constraining the term “waters” to this single definition found
within the dictionary, Scalia concluded that what all of these “waters”
have in common is relative permanence; all are either standing or flowing
bodies of water.264 He further concluded that including channels contain-
ing “merely intermittent or ephemeral flow” within the purview of the term
“waters” would patently go against the “commonsense understanding of
the term.”265
Under this interpretation, Scalia created a “continuous surface
connection” test for wetlands.266 He held that this interpretation was con-
sistent with Riverside Bayview because that decision “rested upon the in-
herent ambiguity in defining where water ends and abutting (‘adjacent’)
wetlands begin.”267 Thus, Scalia interpreted Riverside Bayview to not
stand for the inclusion of wetlands under CWA protection, but only a
confirmation that an agency may regulate a wetland when it is difficult
to ascertain where a navigable water ends and a wetland begins. Under
Scalia’s test, a wetland is only governed by § 404 if it shares a surface
258 Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006)).
259 See id. at 723–28 (discussing his interpretation of “waters of the United States”).
260 Id. at 732.
261 547 U.S. at 732 (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1954) (internal
quotations omitted)).
262 Id. at 733.
263 Id. at 734.
264 Id. at 732.
265 Id. at 733–34.
266 Id. at 742.
267 547 U.S. at 742.
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connection with a water body which would ordinarily be covered under
the CWA.268
Scalia’s conclusions rested on “plain meaning” concepts of statu-
tory interpretation.269 In some regards, Justice Scalia very adamantly
utilizes the tools typically common to this approach. For instance, he finds
support for his interpretation by referentially looking to the definitions
section of the CWA.270 He also uses the dictionary to assist him in ascer-
taining the meaning behind “waters,”271 and discounts expansions to the
term which would not comport with the “commonsense understanding”
of the term.272 However, Scalia ignores certain critical aspects behind the
“plain meaning” theory in order to justify his conclusions.
As discussed previously, some dictionary terms have multiple alter-
native meanings.273 Under such circumstances, the context of a word within
a statute should be instructive in determining which meaning is most
applicable.274 Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, notes that the
term “waters” has more than one definition within the dictionary.275 While
Scalia largely hinges his holding by reasoning that the term “waters”
clearly denotes a permanent or semi-permanent standing or flowing body
of water, Kennedy notes that “waters” can also mean “flood or inunda-
tion,” both of which are “impermanent by definition.”276 Thus, Kennedy
focused his opinion on the larger context of the word within the statute by
focusing on the overall purpose behind the CWA to discern meaning.277
3. Gwaltney Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.
While the interpretation of § 301 in the context of § 404 has had
the greatest and most direct impact on wetland protection efforts, statu-
tory interpretations of other CWA provisions carry the potential to further
268 Id.
269 See id. at 746, 755 (stating that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion and the dissent
are only able to reach their conclusions by largely “ignoring the text of the statute”).
270 See id. at 723 (referring to the definition of “navigable waters” as the primary starting
point for his analysis); see also id. at 735 (finding that “most significant of all” the CWA
defines channels and conduits of intermittent flows of water separately from “navigable
waters” by including them in the definition for “point source”).
271 Id. at 732.
272 547 U.S. at 733–34.
273 Kim, supra note 226, at CRS-6.
274 Id. at CRS-6 to CRS-7.
275 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 770.
276 Id.
277 See id. at 760–78.
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constrain these protections. Citizen suits pursuant to environmental stat-
utes comprise the vast majority of enforcement actions.278 For instance, be-
tween 1993 and 2002, citizen suits comprised seventy-five percent of all
enforcement actions for cases involving the Endangered Species Act, the
Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Clean
Water Act.279 Thus, any constraints on citizen suit provisions carry great
potential to impact the viability of the majority of enforcement actions.280
Within the purview of § 505 of the CWA, the citizen suit provision,
the seminal case of Gwaltney Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foun-
dation, Inc.281 did precisely that.282 Gwaltney involved a § 402 violation
to § 301.283 A facility exceeded the conditions of its NPDES permit and
Respondents sued pursuant to § 505.284 The violations occurred between
1981 and 1984, with the last violation recorded in May, 1984.285 Respon-
dents filed their notice of intent to sue in February, 1984, and filed suit
in June, 1984.286 Section 505 of the CWA states that:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf . . . against any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or
State with respect to such a standard or limit.287
Because the Respondents in Gwaltney brought suit one month after
the facility’s last cited violation, the Court examined the meaning of “to
be in violation of” within the context of § 505.288 The majority found that the
“most natural reading” of “to be in violation” is that the alleged violator
278 Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses Against Them, SR045 ALI-ABA 1141, 1146
(2010).
279 Id.
280 Id. (describing the large impact of citizen suits on the environmental enforcement
landscape).
281 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
282 See id. at 57 (stating that citizen-plaintiffs may only sue for violations which are
continuous or intermittent).
283 See id. at 52–53 (describing the statutory scheme of NPDES permits and the petitioner’s
violations to its permit).
284 Id. at 54.
285 Id. at 53–54.
286 Id. at 54.
287 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (emphasis added).
288 See 484 U.S. at 56 (stating that the Court would resolve the “three-way conflict” among
circuits in determining when a defendant is in violation of the Act).
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must be in a state of either continuous or intermittent violations.289 The
Court elaborated that this means there must be a reasonable likelihood
that the past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.290
The Court supported its conclusion by examining the language in
the remainder of § 505 and in the definitions section.291 First, the Court
found that language in § 505 is consistently in the present tense.292 From
there, it concluded that the definition of “citizen” contained the most
helpful guide for present tense use in the Act.293 The definition of “citizen”
pertinently states: “a person . . . having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected” by the defendant’s violations of the Act.294 The Court
concluded that this language “makes plain” that the use of the present
tense in § 505 only allows redress from a violation that occurs in the pres-
ent or future, but never the past.295
However, just as Justice Kennedy found that “waters” could have
more than one meaning in Rapanos, Justice Scalia concluded that “to be in
violation” has a more plausible meaning than what the majority found.296
While in Rapanos, Kennedy’s dispute with Scalia’s interpretation was pri-
marily over alternate definitions, Scalia’s dispute with the majority is
over grammatical usage.297 The majority concluded that “to be in violation”
denotes an action, but Scalia emphasized that the language in § 505, “to
be in violation,” as opposed to “to be violating,” or “to have committed a
violation,” implies a state rather than an act: “the opposite of a state of
compliance.”298 He elaborated that in order for a violator to be in a “state
of compliance,” she must take remedial steps “that clearly eliminate the
cause of the violation.”299
Although Scalia claims that his standard and the Court’s would
not differ in their practical application,300 this conclusion is most likely only
289 Id. at 57.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 59.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982) (emphasis added).
295 484 U.S. at 58.
296 Id. at 67–69.
297 Compare Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 770 (2006) (stating that a “full reading” of the dic-
tionary definition for “waters” can have multiple meanings and does not inherently imply
permanence), with Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69 (stating that the phrase “to be in violation”
suggests a state, rather than an act).
298 484 U.S. at 69.
299 Id. (emphasis added).
300 Id. at 70. In fact, Scalia believes his standard would “almost certainly produce identical
results in this lawsuit.” Id.
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true for cases involving violations to § 402 NPDES permit violations.301 Be-
cause the nature of a violation to a § 402 permit and a § 404 permit are
vastly different, the “remedial steps” necessary to be in compliance with a
§ 402 permit are very different from those of a § 404 permit.302 Violations
to a § 402 permit stem from a facility discharging more pollutants than its
permit allows.303 When the facility ceases discharging excessively, it is in
compliance.304 Thus the violating act and state of non-compliance are one
and the same—excessive discharges. Section 404 permits differ in that they
do not involve effluent limitations, but involve a permit to fill a specific
site.305 When a violator has exceeded her permit, the only way in which
she can come “into compliance” with her permit is to remove the excess
fill until she returns to the parameters of her permit.306 Thus, while some-
one violating a § 402 permit comes into compliance by ceasing prohibited
acts—discharging pollutants, for example—a person violating § 404 does
not come into compliance by ceasing the act of discharging because the fill
remains in the waterway. By constraining the reading of § 505 to allow
citizens to only sue when the violator is actively discharging, citizens have
no way of enforcing § 404 when they only find a violation after a wetland
has already been filled.
B. Purpose and Legislative History
A second, often subsidiary approach to statutory interpretation is
the use of the purposes and legislative history of a statute to ascertain
301 See North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517, at *3 (E.D.N.C.
Apr. 25, 1989). Many subsequent courts that encounter § 505 citizen suits for § 404 violations
cite the Scalia concurrence precisely because its application creates a very different result for
§ 404 cases involving fill materials. See id. (distinguishing between various types of permit
violations; finding that Scalia’s concurrence only applies to those materials susceptible to
remediation); see also Mountain Park, GA v. Lakeside at Ansley, LLC, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1288,
1294 (emphasizing Scalia’s language that states that a company would be “in violation”
until it takes remedial measures that “clearly eliminate the cause of the violation”).
302 See Mountain Park, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (distinguishing between a violation from
a leachate plume which dissipates and dissolves over time, and that from fill material
which stays intact and thus continues to have roughly the same net polluting effect years
or decades after the deposit).
303 See, e.g., Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53–54 (discussing the actions which led to the Gwaltney
company violating its discharge permit).
304 See id. at 70 (stating that the Court’s standard and Scalia’s would “produce identical
results” in this lawsuit because the Petitioner, by no longer exceeding his NPDES effluent
limitations, has taken remedial steps which cured all past violations).
305 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
306 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012) (authorizing the Administrator to place restrictions on areas
for the purposes of a disposal site).
130 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 39:99
Congressional intent behind certain words.307 Often referred to as imagi-
nary reconstruction, the court attempts to use clues, such as statutory
goals and legislative documents, to conclude what Congress most likely
meant by a word or phrase within a statute.308 This section will examine
two cases, Rapanos and SWANCC, to show how the use of imaginary
reconstruction has impacted the regulation of wetlands under § 404.
1. Rapanos v. United States
In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy employs an approach consistent
with imaginary reconstruction.309 Justice Kennedy opens his discussion
by stating the central goal of the CWA.310 Like Scalia, Kennedy initiates
his analysis by examining the relevant statutory definitions applicable to
§ 301, and identifies the term “navigable waters” as the most relevant.311
However, Kennedy dismisses Scalia’s approach of defining the term
“waters” without consideration of the central goals and purpose of the
CWA.312 He states that a requirement of permanent standing or flowing
water “makes little practical sense in a statute concerned with downstream
water quality.”313 While Scalia criticizes Kennedy’s opinion for “ignoring
the text of the statute,”314 Kennedy criticizes Scalia’s opinion for being
“inconsistent with the Act’s text, structure, and purpose.”315
Kennedy ultimately hangs his hat on the “significant nexus” rea-
soning discussed in Riverside Bayview, and reiterated in SWANCC.316 Quot-
ing Riverside Bayview, Kennedy reaffirmed that “[i]f it is reasonable . . . for
Army Corps to conclude that in the majority of cases, adjacent wetlands
have significant effects on water quality and the aquatic ecosystem, its
307 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 230, at 680–81.
308 See id. at 684 (characterizing imaginary reconstruction as an approach that uses avail-
able evidence to determine what the legislature likely intended by the language used in
the statute).
309 See 547 U.S. 715, 760–78 (2006).
310 Id. at 759.
311 See id. at 760 (stating that the “outcome turns on whether [“navigable waters”] reason-
ably describes certain Michigan wetlands Army Corps seeks to regulate”).
312 Id. at 769.
313 Id.
314 Id. at 755.
315 547 U.S. at 776 (emphasis added).
316 See id. at 767 (“it was the significant nexus between wetlands and ‘navigable waters . . .
that informed our reading of the [Act] in Riverside Bayview Homes.” (quoting SWANCC, 531
U.S. 159 (2001)). Although SWANCC ruled in favor of the Petitioner on other grounds, the
Court recognized that the “significant nexus” that existed between the wetland and navigable
water in Riverside Bayview remained a legitimate application of Army Corps’s authority.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
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definition can stand.”317 He argued that the statute’s goals and purposes
must inform the meaning of “significant nexus.”318 If the wetland, either
alone or when combined with similarly situated lands, affects the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the regulated “navigable water,”
then it has a sufficient “significant nexus” to be regulated under § 404.319
2. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers
While Riverside Bayview and the Kennedy opinion in Rapanos rep-
resent the use of the CWA’s purpose to provide limited support for wetland
protection, the Act’s goals do not always align with wetland protection
goals. For instance, in SWANCC the inclusion of the word “navigable”
within the statute was not the sole reason for the Court’s decision.320 The
Court found that Army Corps’s interpretation also raised “significant con-
stitutional questions,” specifically regarding the States’ traditional power
over “land and water use.”321 In order to determine whether Congress
intended to encroach on a traditional state power, the Court looked to
§ 101 of the CWA, the goals provision.322 Section 101(b) states “[i]t is the
policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to . . . plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water
resources.”323 Based on this goal, the Court concluded that the statute in-
tended, as much as possible, to avoid significant constitutional and feder-
alism questions presented by a broad interpretation of “navigable waters,”
thus choosing a more conservative interpretation.324
IV. FUTURE OF WETLANDS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The future of wetland protection under the CWA is currently very
murky. Supreme Court decisions have led to confusion in lower courts and
governing agencies alike. This Part will examine the current state, and pos-
sible future, of wetland protection in light of currently developing law, as
317 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772–73 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121 (1985)).
318 Id. at 779.
319 Id. at 780.
320 531 U.S. at 174.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).
324 531 U.S. at 174.
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well as how that developing law may be affected by the Supreme Court’s
current trend in statutory interpretation. Part IV.A will discuss EPA’s
current proposed rule, which attempts to clarify the meaning of “waters
of the United States,” and how that definition may be inconsistent with
how the Supreme Court has read the Act. Part IV.B will examine the
legacy of cases that have followed Gwaltney, and how they have tried to
reconcile Gwaltney’s holding with § 404 enforcement actions. It will also
discuss whether these lower court interpretations of Gwaltney are consis-
tent with the original Supreme Court decision, and whether they would
likely withstand the Court’s interpretation of § 505 if the issue were to ever
be re-examined by the Supreme Court in the context of § 404 violations.
A. EPA and Corps’s New Proposed Definition for “Waters of the
United States”
Despite the Supreme Court’s continued narrowing of the CWA’s
jurisdiction over wetlands, EPA and Army Corps continue to try to clarify
and solidify a place for wetlands under the Act.325 In March, 2014, EPA pro-
posed a new rule that would redefine “waters of the United States.”326 The
newly proposed rule seeks to define “waters of the United States” in a man-
ner that is “consistent with the science and the . . . Supreme Court cases.”327
The most major change to the rule would delete the language in
33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3) that grants EPA and Corps jurisdiction over all
“other waters”328 that are or could be used for industrial purposes by indus-
tries in interstate commerce, and has replaced it with jurisdiction over all
“other waters” that, on a case-by-case basis, have a significant nexus to a
traditional navigable water.329 The new language is an attempt to codify
the Kennedy opinion in Rapanos, granting EPA and Corps authority over
any wetland or other nonjurisdictional water that shares a “significant
nexus” with a jurisdictional water, i.e., a navigable water.330 However, the
proposed rule suffers from a major potential weakness. The proposed rule,
325 Definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act 79 Fed Reg.
22188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014).
326 Id.
327 Id. at 22192. According to the proposed rule, reconciling the science with the Supreme
Court decisions is no easy task. See id. at 22195–96. The agencies discuss how “significant”
is not a scientific term, but rather a determination of the agencies in light of the law and
science. Id.
328 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (including wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds).
329 79 Fed. Reg. at 22192.
330 See id. at 22211–17.
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although careful not to classify wetlands as a navigable water, continues to
refer to wetlands as “waters of the United States.”331
By choosing to remove and redefine its definition of “other waters”
found in 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3), EPA and Corps seem to assume that
Rapanos and SWANCC were decided against the agencies because the
wetlands in question were not interstate waters. This is clear from the
fact that the new rule eliminated the language that granted EPA and
Corps jurisdiction over intrastate waters, including lakes, rivers, and
streams, but retains jurisdiction over any type of aquatic ecosystem that
is “interstate” in nature, including wetlands.332
The policy reasons for this interpretation are consistent with the
agency’s previous attempts to interpret the CWA in a manner that protects
all aquatic ecosystems. Although intrastate aquatic ecosystems could not
categorically be regulated under the CWA, the rule would still cover many
of the nation’s aquatic ecosystems, including those that are intrastate,
under the rule’s definition of “significant nexus.”333 Consistent with the
Act’s stated purpose, the rule would deem any aquatic ecosystem to have
a “significant nexus” with a traditional waterway if that ecosystem itself or
in the aggregate with similarly situated ecosystems had an impact on a tra-
ditional navigable waterway’s chemical, physical, or biological integrity.334
This interpretation is inconsistent with SWANCC and Rapanos.
As discussed in Part III, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Act in a
manner consistent with its original pollution control purpose, and has not
expanded the scope of the Act beyond that.335 Yet the new rule issued by
EPA, while frequently discussing the Act’s pollution control purpose, also
discusses how the new rule will have many environmental benefits; many
of which are focused on preserving aquatic ecosystems and the benefits
they provide beyond water quality.336 The rule retains a strong emphasis
on trying to protect a range of aquatic ecosystems, especially by trying to
331 See id. at 22191 (stating that “[w]aters of the United States” include wetlands); id. at
22193 (including interstate wetlands under the definition of “waters of the United States”);
id. at 22197 (stating that some non-adjacent waters may have a significant nexus to tra-
ditional navigable waters).
332 Compare id. at 22193 with 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3).
333 See 79 Fed. Reg. at 22211–17.
334 Id. at 22211.
335 See supra Part III.
336 See Definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act 79 Fed. Reg.
at 22194 (mentioning that the rule may impact water quality, fisheries, recreation, and other
ecological services); id. at 22214 (discussing biological connectivity of aquatic ecosystems,
where some species may have different stages of their life cycle in different ecosystems).
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retain authority over all interstate wetlands as well as demonstrating
through hundreds of scientific studies the impact that one or an aggre-
gate of “similarly situated” wetlands can have on a traditionally naviga-
ble waterway.337
The majority of the rule is consistent with the Kennedy opinion, and
should be able to withstand Supreme Court scrutiny. However, in its
attempt to gain wide-breadth jurisdiction over wetlands, EPA and Corps
have not addressed some of the key points raised in SWANCC and Rapanos
that may narrow the rule’s jurisdiction. For instance, in SWANCC, the
most determinative point that led to the court finding against Army Corps
was the fact that it held that “navigability” must have some meaning.338
Specifically the Court held that the CWA only had jurisdiction over water-
ways that “were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably
be so made.”339
Harkening back to The Daniel Ball, the Supreme Court today
defines “navigable in fact” essentially the same way as the first prong of
The Daniel Ball test. That is, the waterway must be susceptible to being
used, in its ordinary condition, “as highways for commerce . . . modes of
trade and travel on water.”340 The court in Callaway concluded that the
definition of “navigable waters” under the CWA cannot be limited to the
traditional test for navigability, i.e., The Daniel Ball test.341 Given that
The Daniel Ball test consists of two prongs, and the Supreme Court has
explicitly stated the first prong applies to the CWA’s jurisdiction, it is the
second prong, the requirement that waters be interstate, that does not
apply.342 This interpretation is consistent with SWANCC, where the
Court concluded that Army Corps could only claim jurisdiction over waters
that are navigable in fact or could reasonably be made to be so.343
This is nearly the opposite of the approach EPA and Corps took
in their proposed rule. They concluded that they retained jurisdiction
over all interstate waters “including wetlands,” but gave up jurisdiction
over all intrastate waters, including those which are navigable in fact,
337 See id. at 22200 (defending its continued inclusion of interstate wetlands in the definition
of “waters of the United States”); id. at 22212–13 (discussing the definition of “similarly situ-
ated”); id. at 22222 (summarizing the scientific studies in support of the proposed rule).
338 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).
339 Id.
340 See PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S.Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012) (quoting The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. 557 (1870)).
341 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686.
342 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 564.
343 531 U.S. at 172.
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such as lakes, rivers, and streams.344 EPA and Corps support their decision
to continue to include interstate wetlands in their definition for “waters
of the United States” primarily because they conclude that Congress
intended the term “navigable waters” to include interstate waters without
imposing a requirement that they be traditional navigable waters.345
Although this is true, the limits on the expansion, as discussed, still require
that the waters be navigable in fact, which would not include many types
of interstate wetlands.
EPA and Corps’s jurisdiction over wetlands does not stem from
them being “waters of the United States,” under the Supreme Court’s logic.
In Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos, the Court never stated
that wetlands were “waters” for CWA jurisdictional purposes.346 What
those cases continued to reiterate up through the Kennedy opinion was
that it is the wetland’s impact on “waters of the United States” that grants
Army Corps the authority to regulate them under the CWA.347 Thus,
these cases imply that without such an impact, a wetland, unless naviga-
ble in fact, can never fall under the CWA jurisdiction, because a wetland in
itself is not a “water.”
Thanks to the enormous scientific undertaking that supports the
rule’s conclusions regarding “other waters” impacts on traditional navi-
gable waters, the rule, if passed, is still likely to protect many aquatic
ecosystems, including wetlands. However, wetlands will likely never receive
independent protection under the Act. Their protection is completely
dependent on how they impact the water quality of downstream tradi-
tional navigable waterways, despite the enormous impact they can have
on interstate commerce when destroyed.348 If wetlands are to receive
adequate protection in their own right, Congress must act as it did when
the RHA ran up against its outer limits; Congress must pass a new statute
with ecosystem protection in mind.
B. Future of Enforcement for § 404 Actions
Gwaltney resolved the limits of citizen suit enforcement for the
CWA in the context of the § 402 permitting program, but many lower
344 See Definition of “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act 79 Fed. Reg.
at 22192–93.
345 Id. at 22200.
346 See supra Parts II.C–III.
347 See id.
348 See supra Part I.B.
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courts have declined to extend its logic to § 404 enforcement actions. The
“continuous or intermittent” violation requirement decided in Gwaltney
binds all subsequent cases involving citizen suits under the CWA.349
However, Gwaltney did not specifically identify when a violation is no
longer continuous.350 In Gwaltney, the Petitioners had ceased exceeding
the parameters of their NPDES permit a month before the suit.351 The
Court determined that if Gwaltney was no longer violating its NPDES
permit, the citizen group could not sue.352 While a violating action under
§§ 402 and 404 may be substantially similar,353 many courts have found
that ongoing violations are very different under the two statutes.354
Courts have relied a great deal on the differences in pollutants to
find ongoing violations in § 404 cases where violations would not exist in
§ 402 cases. The courts emphasize that, unlike other pollutants, the pol-
luting effects of fill materials do not significantly dissipate or dissolve
over long periods of time, and thus the harm caused by the violation con-
tinues until the fill is removed.355 Emphatically, the courts repeat that
when the effects of a defendant’s violation continue to injure a citizen’s in-
terests, then the violation itself is ongoing.356 These courts agree that it is
unlikely Congress intended such a result.357
The courts secondarily rely on the “remedial measures” standard set
forth by Scalia in his concurrence. Several federal district courts have found
the Scalia concurrence to be a more reasonable test for § 404 violations
because they conclude that “it is not the physical act of discharging . . . that
349 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987) (remanding the case in order to determine whether there was a
good-faith allegation of a continuing violation).
350 Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp.2d 81, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
351 484 U.S. at 53–54.
352 Id. at 64.
353 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344. In both circumstances, the violator exceeds her permit by
discharging an excess of allotted pollutants.
354 See, e.g., City of Mountain Park, GA v. Lakeside at Ansley, LLC, 560 F. Supp.2d 1288,
1296 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (noting that most cases split on Gwaltney’s application dependent
on the type of pollutant).
355 Id.
356 See id. at 1293; see also North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Woodbury, 1989 WL
106517, at *2 (1990) (stating that it is the consequences of a violation which leads to the
injury that gives a citizen standing to sue); see also Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Goss, 2005
WL 1563433 (N.D. Ind. June 28, 2005) (quoting Woodbury 1989 WL 106517).
357 See Mountain Park, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (asserting that Congress probably intended
to allow citizens to sue in cases involving a filled wetland); see also Greenfield Mills, 2005
WL 1563433, at *5 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (finding that Congress surely did not desire an outcome
where citizens could not sue for a violation that continues to cause them harm).
2014] CHANGING LEAD INTO GOLD 137
leads to the injury . . . but the consequences of the discharge.”358 Courts
have found the Scalia opinion applicable to § 404 violations because
dredged materials continue to leach pollutants long after their initial dis-
charge and because dredged materials can be removed from the water-
way while pollutants governed by § 402 cannot.359
Although the majority of lower courts conclude that § 404 violations
are distinctly different from § 402 violations, it is questionable whether
their interpretation would hold up if examined by the Supreme Court.360
Largely, the opinions rely on distinguishing the consequences of fill materi-
als from other pollutants,361 and by focusing on the “remedial measures”
standard in Scalia’s Gwaltney concurrence.362
The majority in Gwaltney focused on the act of violating—whether
it has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur again—but made no
mention of differentiating between types of polluting materials.363 In fact,
specific language within the majority opinion seems to stand directly
opposed to the lower courts’ reliance on the consequences of a violation:
“the most natural reading” of “continuous violation” is whether there is
“a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in
the future.”364 This language implies that the nature of a pollutant is
irrelevant, and that the only pertinent question is whether the polluter
is likely to act again in a manner which will violate his permit.365
The plain meaning of the text of the Act forms the foundation for
statutory interpretation.366 Given that the Supreme Court has already
358 See Mountain Park, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1293–94; see also Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517,
at *2.
359 See Mountain Park, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1296; see also Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517, at *3.
360 See Mountain Park, 560 F. Supp. at 1296 (noting that the majority of cases dealing
with fill materials deem them to constitute an “ongoing” violation while they remain in
the water, while the majority of cases involving other types of pollutants adopt the
stricter interpretation).
361 Id. (noting that unlike other pollutants which dissipate and dissolve, the net polluting
effect for fill materials is roughly the same over years or decades); see also Woodbury,
1989 WL 106517, at *2 (stating that it is the consequences of a violation which leads to the
injury that gives a citizen standing to sue); see also Greenfield Mills, 2005 WL 1563433,
at *4 (quoting Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517).
362 See Mountain Park, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (partially relying on Scalia’s conclusion
that a polluter is in violation “so long as it has not put in place remedial measures that
clearly eliminate the cause of the violation”) (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49, 69 (1987));
see also Woodbury, 1989 WL 106517, at *2 (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69).
363 See 484 U.S. at 56–67.
364 Id. at 57.
365 See id.
366 See Clark & Connolly, supra note 219, at 3.
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ruled on the plain meaning of “continuous violation,” there is a strong
possibility that the definition will be extended to all types of violations.367
If the majority opinion of Gwaltney is extended to § 404, many citizen
suits, which represent the majority of all enforcement actions, will be
unable to bring suit against violators who have filled wetlands beyond
permit limits.368 Under the Gwaltney holding, citizen groups would have
to catch a violator while in the act of filling a wetland, and would be unable
to pursue an action if the damage is already complete.369
CONCLUSION
Although the future of wetland protection under the CWA may
seem dim, EPA and Army Corps continue to push for new regulations
that will clarify wetlands’ place under the Act.370 The proposed rule re-
defining “waters of the United States” would lean toward pushing the
Kennedy opinion in Rapanos by filing a concurrent report emphasizing
the importance of streams and wetlands on downstream waterways re-
gardless of the size or permanence of the water body.371 The report has
synthesized the results of 1,000 scientific, peer-reviewed studies to arrive
at this conclusion.372 Remaining in line with prior Supreme Court deci-
sions, the agencies strongly emphasize how the new rule is intertwined
with the protection of water quality of larger downstream waterways.373
However, the case law has forced EPA and Army Corps to bend over back-
wards trying to protect the nation’s diverse set of ecosystems classified as
wetlands into the purview of the CWA’s language.374 The rule epitomizes
367 See, e.g., Connecticut Coastal Fishermen Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305,
1313 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that the residual effects of a pollutant as it dissolves in a
waterway does not constitute a “continuing violation”).
368 See Lloyd, supra note 278, at 1159.
369 See 484 U.S. at 57.
370 See Lenny Bernstein, EPA moves to Clarify Clean Water Act Protections; GOP Lawmaker
Slams Effort, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sep. 17, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost
.com/2013-09-17/national/42145039_1_clean-water-act-small-streams-and-wetlands
-protections, archived at http://perma.cc/RHR2-DU6K.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 See Clean Water Act Definition of “Waters of the United States,” U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (Sep. 24, 2013), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-04/documents/fr
-2014-07142.pdf.
374 See Importance of Waters and Wetlands Documented in New EPA Report, AMMOLAND
(Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.ammoland.com/2013/10/importance-of-waters-and-wetlands
-documented-in-new-epa-report/#axzz2hqCP5rGS, archived at http://perma.cc/Y3ZM-CTEC
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the agencies’ restraints in providing wetlands with adequate protection
under a statute targeted for water quality.
Ultimately, the CWA is a pollution-control statute, and was never
intended to be a statute for ecosystem protection.375 Just as Congress be-
came frustrated with trying to use the RHA as a primary tool for pollu-
tion control, Army Corps and EPA’s efforts to protect wetlands through the
CWA have continued to be frustrated. While the agencies are hard at work
to promulgate new regulations which will solidify wetlands’ place within
the term “waters of the United States,” prior Supreme Court decisions have
already severely limited the extent to which the term can apply to these
ecosystems.376 Given that the language in the Act is focused almost exclu-
sively on pollution control, the agencies have little room to make a case
for ecosystem protection based on the Act’s language.
Currently, it is only the Riverside Bayview’s focus on the benefits
wetlands provide to the water quality of adjacent water bodies that pro-
vides wetlands any protection under the Act at all; all subsequent case law
released by the Supreme Court has constricted these protections rather
than expanding them.377 As science continues to reveal more benefits that
all wetlands provide, the need to preserve these ecosystems is greater than
ever. It may be time for Congress to recognize the Act’s inherent weak-
nesses in providing ecosystem protections and draft new legislation that
focuses on these values rather than bending an old statute into a new form.
(stating that compilation of scientific data could not draw a broadly applicable conclusion
for all types of wetlands under the CWA).
375 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).
376 Id.
377 Id.
